Although researchers studying human speech recognition (HSR) and automatic speech recognition (ASR) share a common interest in how information processing systems (human or machine) recognize spoken language, there is little communication between the two disciplines. We suggest that this lack of communication follows largely from the fact that research in these related fields has focused on the mechanics of how speech can be recognized. In Marr's (1982) terms, emphasis has been on the algorithmic and implementational levels rather than on the (...) computational level. In this article, we provide a computational-level analysis of the task of speech recognition, which reveals the close parallels between research concerned with HSR and ASR. We illustrate this relation by presenting a new computational model of human spoken-word recognition, built using techniques from the field of ASR that, in contrast to current existing models of HSR, recognizes words from real speech input. (shrink)

Although researchers studying human speech recognition (HSR) and automatic speech recognition (ASR) share a common interest in how information processing systems (human or machine) recognize spoken language, there is little communication between the two disciplines. We suggest that this lack of communication follows largely from the fact that research in these related fields has focused on the mechanics of how speech can be recognized. In Marr's (1982) terms, emphasis has been on the algorithmic and implementational levels rather than on the (...) computational level. In this article, we provide a computational‐level analysis of the task of speech recognition, which reveals the close parallels between research concerned with HSR and ASR. We illustrate this relation by presenting a new computational model of human spoken‐word recognition, built using techniques from the field of ASR that, in contrast to current existing models of HSR, recognizes words from real speech input. (shrink)

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), esprit universel et promoteur des sciences, est à la fois philosophe, mathématicien et diplomate. Passionné par le langage et le monde, il cherche en encyclopédiste à rendre compte de toutes les inventions et de tous les savoirs. Lors de son séjour à Paris - quatre années pendant lesquelles il rencontre Huygens et étudie Pascal -, il conçoit, en 1675, un projet original de création d'académies, plusieurs spectacles de divertissement. Imaginant des mises en scène ou cherchant à (...) régler la direction des casinos, le philosophe raisonne toujours en stratège. Pour lui, tout dans le monde est combinatoire. D'où son amour pour les jeux, qui associent signes et réseaux. Ainsi se dévoile une Europe savante et inventive qui anticipe notre monde relationnel et numérique. (shrink)

Computational modelling has proven to be a valuable approach in developing theories of spoken-word processing. In this paper, we focus on a particular class of theories in which it is assumed that the spoken-word recognition process consists of two consecutive stages, with an `abstract' discrete symbolic representation at the interface between the stages. In evaluating computational models, it is important to bring in independent arguments for the cognitive plausibility of the algorithms that are selected to compute the processes in a (...) theory. This paper discusses the relation between behavioural studies, theories, and computational models of spoken-word recognition. We explain how computational models can be assessed in terms of the goodness of fit with the behavioural data and the cognitive plausibility of the algorithms. An in-depth analysis of several models provides insights into how computational modelling has led to improved theories and to a better understanding of the human spoken-word recognition process. (shrink)

(2013). Open Access Digital Data Sharing: Principles, Policies and Practices☆. Social Epistemology: Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 47-67. doi: 10.1080/02691728.2012.760663.

This article reports on the methodology for setting the Mexican User Satisfaction Index for Social Programs as tested in seven national social programs. The evaluation is based on Structural Equation Modeling. How satisfaction takes the central place of the SEM, which postulates its causes and effects, contributes to the increased validity and reliability of satisfaction indicators that allow benchmarking between social programs. The MUSI model is an adaptation of the American Customer Satisfaction Index model. The MUSI methodology includes qualitative and (...) quantitative techniques. The estimation model is by the Partial Least Squares. In each of the seven social programs, no statistical evidence was found to reject the main relationships postulated by the ACSI’s model: that Perceived Quality impacts Satisfaction, and Satisfaction impacts Trust. The improvement opportunity areas were also identified for each program. These results give valid and reliable feedback to public policies. (shrink)

The remarkable performance of large language models (LLMs) on complex linguistic tasks has sparked debate about their capabilities. Unlike humans, these models learn language solely from textual data without directly interacting with the world. Yet they generate seemingly meaningful text on diverse topics. This achievement has renewed interest in the classical `Symbol Grounding Problem' -- the question of whether the internal representations and outputs of symbolic AI systems can possess intrinsic meaning that is not parasitic on external interpretation. Although modern (...) LLMs compute over vectors rather than symbols, an analogous problem arises for these systems, which we call the Vector Grounding Problem. This paper has two main goals. First, we distinguish five main notions of grounding that are often conflated in the literature, and argue that only one of them, which we call referential grounding, is relevant to the Vector Grounding Problem. Second, drawing on philosophical theories of representational content, we provide two arguments for the claim that LLMs and related systems can achieve referential grounding: (1) through preference fine-tuning methods that explicitly establish world-involving functions, and (2) through pre-training alone, which in limited domains may select for internal states with world-involving content, as mechanistic interpretability research suggests. Through these pathways, LLMs can establish connections to the world sufficient for intrinsic meaning. One potentially surprising implication of our discussion is that that multimodality and embodiment are neither necessary nor sufficient to overcome the Grounding Problem. *Note: this is an updated and improved version of the preprint originally made available on ArXiv in 2023.*. (shrink)

SummaryMany historians of science recognize that the outcome of the celebrated debate on Boltzmann's H-Theorem, which took place in the weekly scientific journal Nature, beginning at the end of 1894 and continuing throughout most of 1895, was the recognition of the statistical hypothesis in the proof of the theorem. This hypothesis is the Stosszahlansatz or “hypothesis about the number of collisions.” During the debate, the Stosszahlansatz was identified with another statistical hypothesis, which appeared in Proposition II of Maxwell's 1860 paper; (...) Burbury called it Condition A. Later in the debate, Bryan gave a clear formulation of the Stosszahlansatz. However, the two hypotheses are prima facie different. Burbury interchanged them without justification or even warning his readers. This point deserves clarification, since it touches upon subtle questions related to the foundation of the theory of heat. A careful reading of the arguments presented by Burbury and Bryan in their various invocations of both hypotheses can clarify this technical point. The Stosszahlansatz can be understood in terms of geometrical invariances of the problem of a collision between two spheres. A byproduct of my analysis is a clarification of the debate itself, which is apparently obscure. (shrink)

SummaryThis paper is concerned with the introduction of statistical concepts in the molecular theory of heat. In particular, we analyse the arguments invoked by Clausius between 1857 and 1862, and the motivation presented by Maxwell in 1860 to introduce his distribution of velocities. We first show that Maxwell's great insight seems to have been the recognition that the dynamical laws of molecular collision and thermal equilibrium could be made compatible only if the theory of heat became statistical. As for Clausius, (...) historians of science have observed that in 1857 he used probabilities to bring regularity to the theory, but have not satisfactorily analysed important features of his use of probabilities in the context of the theory of heat. We show that only in 1862, in order to answer a criticism to his paper of 1858, Clausius gave a meaning to random motion, along the lines proposed by Maxwell, in his paper of 1860. (shrink)

William Thomson published between 1849 and 1852 three influential papers on the theory of heat. However, historians of science have already called attention to Thomson's difficulties in reconciling a principle formulated by James Prescott Joule with another principle formulated by Nicolas Leonard Sadi Carnot, and to errors Thomson made in his calculations. In the meantime, Rudolf Julius Emmanuel Clausius reconciled the two principles, and in 1854 he derived an expression for Carnot's principle. The author and collaborators have shown elsewhere that (...) it was fundamental to Clausius' reasoning that he took to its ultimate consequence the meaning of Carnot's principle as a ‘recovery’ condition. Thomson somehow let the meaning of ‘recovery’ escape him. Therefrom came his troubles. He seems to have been so obsessed by his initial difficulties that he put the emphasis on irreversibility and on conservation of energy, missing ‘all the rest’. (shrink)

Ensayos (de la revista "Lumen")--Conferencias.--Mensajes.

A white expatriate American contrasts the ease with which he traverses the world to the obstacles faced by his brown, Muslim, non-American traveling companion and partner.

Cognitive representations are typically analysed in terms of content, vehicle and format. While current work on formats appeals to intuitions about external representations, such as words and maps, in this paper we develop a computational view of formats that does not rely on intuitions. In our view, formats are individuated by the computational profiles of vehicles, i.e., the set of constraints that fix the computational transformations vehicles can undergo. The resulting picture is strongly pluralistic, it makes space for a variety (...) of different formats, and is intimately tied to the computational approach to cognition in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

The notion of intelligence is relevant to several fields of research, including cognitive and comparative psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and philosophy, among others. However, there is little agreement within and across these fields on how to characterise and explain intelligence. I put forward a behavioural, operational characterisation of intelligence that can play an integrative role in the sciences of intelligence, as well as preserve the distinctive explanatory value of the notion, setting it apart from the related concepts of cognition and (...) rationality. Finally, I examine a popular hypothesis about the underpinnings of intelligence: the capacity to manipulate internal representations of the environment. I argue that the hypothesis needs refinement, and that so refined, it applies only to some forms of intelligence. (shrink)

I analyze a tension at the core of the mechanistic view of computation generated by its joint commitment to the medium independence of computational vehicles and to computational systems possessing teleological functions to compute. While computation is individuated in medium-independent terms, teleology is sensitive to the constitutive physical properties of vehicles. This tension spells trouble for the mechanistic view, suggesting that there can be no teleological functions to compute. I argue that, once considerations about the relevant function-bestowing factors for computational (...) systems are brought to bear, the tension dissolves: physical systems can have the teleological function to compute. (shrink)

An influential view in cognitive science is that computation in cognitive systems is semantic, conceptually depending on representation: to compute is to manipulate representations. I argue that accepting the non-semantic teleomechanistic view of computation lays the ground for a promising alternative strategy, in which computation helps to explain and naturalise representation, rather than the other way around. I show that this computation-based approach to representation presents six decisive advantages over the semantic view. I claim that it can improve the two (...) most influential current theories of representation, teleosemantics and structural representation, by providing them with precious tools to tackle some of their main shortcomings. In addition, the computation-based approach opens up interesting new theoretical paths for the project of naturalising representation, in which teleology plays a role in individuating computations, but not representations. (shrink)

ROCHA, Maria da Penha Nunes da. As estratégias de comunicação da Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus. GOMES, Suzana dos Santos. Tessituras docentes de avaliação formativa.

In contrast to mainstream accounts which explain the aesthetic experience of people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in terms of cognitive abilities, this paper suggests as an alternative explanation the “emotional abilities approach”. We present an example of a person with ASD who is able to exercise a variety of emotional abilities in aesthetic contexts but who has difficulties exhibiting their equivalents in interpersonal relations. Using an autobiographical account, we demonstrate first that there is at least one precedent where a (...) person with ASD can exercise a series of emotional abilities when engaging with art works. Second, we offer also an explanation about why aesthetic contexts might enable this person to exercise emotional abilities which in interpersonal contexts seem to be blocked. (shrink)

The origin of moral agency is a much-debated issue. While rationalists or Kantians have argued that moral agency is rooted in reason, sentimentalists or Humeans have ascribed its origin to empathic feelings. This debate between rationalists and sentimentalists still stands with respect to persons with mental disorders, such as individuals diagnosed with mild forms of Autism Spectrum Disorder, without intellectual impairment. Individuals with ASD are typically regarded as moral agents, however their ability for empathy remains debated. The goal of this (...) paper is to investigate the mechanisms of moral actions in people with ASD, by finding arguments for the origin of their moral actions, supporting either the sentimentalist or the rationalist view of the dispute. We propose to revisit the debate using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis to study the autobiographies of individuals with High-Functioning Autism and Asperger Syndrome. While conducting the systematic analysis of 10 autobiographies, we re-examined both the rationalist and the sentimentalist positions, considering the links between empathic feelings and moral agency. The investigation of the temporal dimensions of emotional experiences, an aspect overlooked by previous research, indicated that individuals with ASD empathize with others, but in different ways as compared to neurotypicals. A relationship between emotional experience and the type of moral agency exhibited by individuals with forms of ASD was established. As a consequence, our analyses support the sentimentalist stance on moral action. (shrink)

Since Seligman's 1971 statement that the vast majority of phobias are about objects essential to the survival of a species, a multitude of laboratory studies followed, supporting the finding that humans learn to fear and detect snakes (and other animals) faster than other stimuli. Most of these studies used schematic drawings, images, or pictures of snakes, and only a small amount of fieldwork in naturalistic environments was done. We address fear preparedness theories, and automatic fast detection data from mainstream laboratory (...) data and compares it with ethobehavioural information relative to snakes, predator-prey interaction, and snakes’ defensive kinematics strikes in order to analyse their potential matching. From this analysis four main findings arose, namely that: 1) Snakebites occur when people are very close to the snake and are unaware or unable to escape the bite; 2) Human visual detection and escape response is slow compared to the speed of snake strikes; 3) In natural environments, snake experts are often unable to see snakes existing nearby; 4) animate objects in general capture more attention over other stimuli and dangerous but recent objects in evolutionary terms are also able to be detected fast. The issues mentioned above pose several challenges to evolutionary psychology-based theories expecting to find special-purpose neural modules. The older selective habituation hypothesis (Schleidt, 1961), that prey animals start with a rather general predator image from which specific harmless cues are removed by habituation might deserve reconsideration. (shrink)

Esta é uma tradução do texto "What are plants saying about us?" (O que as plantas estão dizendo sobre nós?) publicado originalmente pela Nautilus Science Magazine. O texto explora as complexas capacidades das plantas, usando-as para desafiar visões tradicionais das ciências cognitivas sobre a mente humana. Com base no trabalho de Barret e Calvo, a autora explica que as plantas têm habilidade de responder ao seu entorno com comportamento inteligente, e isso nos permite questionar se neurônios são necessários para haver (...) cognição. Calvo defende que não. No texto, à medida que as capacidades e ações das plantas vão sendo relatadas, questionamos cada vez mais suposições como: a necessidade do cérebro e/ou representações mentais para haver cognição. Assim, a autora apresenta, de forma clara e introdutória, uma crítica ao modo de pensar a cognição a partir da analogia com o funcionamento de máquinas, em favor da compreensão de seres vivos a partir das ideias da cognição corporificada, estendida, integrada e enativa (4E) e da psicologia ecológica. (shrink)

The concept of indiscernibility in a structure is analysed with the aim of emphasizing that in asserting that two objects are indiscernible, it is useful to consider these objects as members of (the domain of) a structure. A case for this usefulness is presented by examining the consequences of this view to the philosophical discussion on identity and indiscernibility in quantum theory.